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What happens when a satellite owned by a private company in one
state crashes into another state's satellite? International space law has
an answer. The solution, however, reflects a bygone, state-centric era
created by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. A better system must meet
demands of the emerging commercial space sector. The treaty
framework governing state activities in outer space reflects Cold War
fears. Consequently, the space liability regime favors diplomatic,
cooperative dispute resolution between states. States, therefore, must
sponsor private entities' claims. If the treaty process is ineffective,
state responsibility and international liability fill the gaps left by the
space liability regime. Today, space is increasingly crowded as
commercial ventures launch into space. For them, a state-centric
liability regime is ineffective. I conclude by suggesting that states back
commercial ventures by subsidizing liability insurance and encourage
the private sector to circumvent the treaty framework through
contractual allocation of risk.
INTRODUCTION
Outer space has awed humanity for centuries. People, across the
globe, turn their faces up to the night sky in wonder. Artists and
musicians seek inspiration from it. Scientists, who until recently
needed to look up for study, have found ways to break the chains of
gravity and travel beyond our globe. With this achievement, humanity
is reaching beyond the Earth's surface to place technology in space to
enhance our quality of life through communicating nearly
instantaneously throughout the global,' weather reporting,2 remote
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sensing3 of the Earth's surface to better manage natural resources, 4 and
applying advances from space research and development here on
Earth.5 The horizon is bright for humanity if space is used in a
thoughtful, efficient manner. For this to happen, law must govern outer
space.
Before formal space law developed, prominent international law
scholars, politicians, scientists, and some science fiction authors6
considered how law and space would interact. This diverse collection of
thinkers helped set the stage for more formal legal talks and helped
cement the spirit of cooperation through the foundational legal
documents enumerating outer space law.7 These documents, although
crafted with an eye on cooperation and a brighter future, are products
of the Westphalian state system. In 1648, the Peace of Westphalia
created the modern foundation of international law by building
international relations around organized states with geographic
boundaries. Consequently, solutions must come from the state-centric
international legal regime despite the focus on cooperation. This
cooperative spirit must continue and evolve to become a stabilizing
force that tempers national interest. A space law liability regime that
embodies this will likely be more effective than one where states
jealously guard their sovereignty.
In 1989, Space Services, Inc. changed the status quo of space law
when it becomes the first private company to launch a satellite into
1. I.H. PH. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & V. KoPAL, AN INTRODUCTION TO SPACE LAW 55
(3d ed. 2008).
2. Id. at 53-54.
3. "Remote sensing" is the practice of observing and imaging land from above. With
the advent of satellite imaging, remote sensing can cover vastly larger areas than early
aircraft-based reconnaissance. Id. at 70.
4. Sergio Marchisio, Remote Sensing for Sustainable Development in International
Law, in OUTLOOK ON SPACE LAW OVER THE NEXT 30 YEARS 335, 335-37 (Gabriel
Lafferranderie & Daphn4 Crowther eds., 1997); e.g., Press Release, NASA, NASA and
USAID Pledge to Advance International Development with Science and Technology (Apr.
25, 2011), available at http://www.nasa.govfhome/hqnews/2011/apr/HQ-11-123_NASA
USAID.html.
5. See GLENN H. REYNOLDS & ROBERT P. MERGES, OUTER SPACE: PROBLEMS OF LAW
AND POLICY 18-22 (1989).
6. E.g., NAT SCHACHNER, SPACE LAWYER (1953). This is the story of a young,
hotshot space lawyer named Kerry Dale. After a dispute with his irascible boss, Dale
rockets around the solar system using his knowledge of the "star code" and brilliant legal
mind to best his former boss in business and woo the boss's beautiful daughter. In the
end Dale, of course, gets the girl.
7. See Jennifer Frakes, Comment, The Common Heritage of Mankind Principle and
the Deep Seabed, Outer Space, and Antarctica: Will Developed and Developing Nations
Reach a Compromise?, 21 WIS. INT'L L.J. 409, 422 (2003) ('The Outer Space Treaty was
based on politics and future visions of space exploration for all mankind .... ).
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orbit.8  Due to technological advancements in rocketry and the
retirement of the Space Shuttle, even more private space actors are
expected to launch payloads into space.9 Cooperation is increasingly
important1 0 because outer space is becoming more cluttered as states
and commercial ventures undertake other space missions and launch
more satellites and space stations.
Experts estimate that of the approximately "19,000 man-made
objects in orbit," only 900 of those objects are satellites." This junk,
which includes dead satellites, paint flecks, wrenches, and other
spacecraft detritus, is called "space debris" and poses a significant
danger to any operation in space.' 2 For example, a 0.2 millimeter in
diameter paint chip caused quite a scare when it pitted the Space
Shuttle Challenger's windshield.'8 If space debris is left unchecked,
scientists worry that low Earth orbit will become unusable.14 The
"Kessler effect" posits that at a certain point, a cascade of collisions will
envelop Earth and close off access to certain areas of space. Debris
mitigation policies, which ideally require space objects to not jettison
debris and be removed from orbit at end-of-life, are not uniformly
adopted by space powers. 15 The United Nations, however, made a large
leap forward in 2008 when the General Assembly adopted debris
mitigation guidelines with the intent to limit orbital hazards. 16
With more actors in space, there will be more collisions, which will
lead to more claims for liability.17 These claims will present a challenge
because, although international space law has a framework for
8. Andre G. DeBusschere, Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 3 J. INT'L
L. & PRAC. 97, 104 (1994).
9. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KoPAL, supra note 1, at 106; NANDASIRI
JASENTULIYANA, INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW AND THE UNITED NATIONS 321, 325-26
(1999); Irene Klotz, US Looks to Private Sector as Shuttle Program Ends, REUTERS, July
5, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/05/uk-space-shuttle-commercial-idUSLNE
76404L20110705.
10. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 23; JASENTULIYANA, supra
note 9, at 216.
11. Robert P. Merges & Glenn H. Reynolds, Rules of the Road for Space?: Satellite
Collisions and the Inadequacy of Current Space Law, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS
10009, 10010 (2010); Tariq Malik, Space Junk Around Earth on the Rise, Experts Say,
SPACE.COM (Apr. 29, 2009), http://www.space.com/news/090429-space-debris-safety.html.
12. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KoPAL, supra note 1, at 127; BRUCE A. HURWITZ,
STATE LIABILITY FOR OUTER SPACE ACTIVITIES 1-3 (1992); Malik, supra note 11.
13. Due to the incredibly high speeds of objects in orbit, even the tiniest of debris can
cause significant damages. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 127;
JASENTULIYANA, supra note 9, at 321-22.
14. Donald J. Kessler & Burton G. Cour-Palais, Collision Frequency of Artificial
Satellites: The Creation of a Debris Belt, 83 J. GEOPHYSICAL RES. 1985, 2637 (1978).
15. See FRANCIS LYALL & PAUL B. LARSEN, SPACE LAW: A TREATISE 308-10 (2009).
16. G.A. Res. 62/217, U.N. Doc. AIRES/62/217 (Feb. 1, 2008).
17. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 121.
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assigning liability, it is a state-centric regime that does not address
private actors.18 General principles of international law, however, fill
the gaps left in the space liability regime. While state responsibility
and international liability do much to assuage liability concerns, they
are still unwieldy for private actors. Going forward, states need to
balance providing recovery to victims without stifling commercial space
development.
Part I of this paper discusses the development of outer space law
generally. The legal documents developed concurrently with leaps of
technological advancements, meaning foundational documents were
drafted with the future in mind. Coupled with the intent of tempering
Cold War fears, early space law documents built a highly aspirational
legal framework, which lead states to draft more workable laws guided
by the space treaties. Part II focuses on the liability framework
established by the Outer Space Treaty and the Liability Convention. In
particular, this section clarifies important terms, discusses the claim
process and the different liability regimes, explains how compensation
is made, and how a state limits its liability. Part III explores
traditional international law principles of state responsibility and
international liability, which gaps in the space treaties. Part IV then
discusses how Canada used the Liability Convention to make a claim
for damages caused by the crash of the Soviet Union's Cosmos 954
satellite. This is the only case where Liability Convention has been
used to solve a dispute. Although the procedures were not rigorously
applied, the Convention did help resolve the dispute. In conclusion, the
space liability regime must change to encourage private space
development. The state-centric regime serves an important purpose,
but it must relax in order to allow more commercial actors to develop.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF OUTER SPACE LAW
A. Enter Space Law
On October 4, 1957, a beach ball sized metal sphere called Sputnik
blasted into orbit and opened the eyes of the world to a new frontier of
scientific and technological exploration. The 1960s were a decade of
rapid advances in space technology as the United States and Soviet
Union launched larger manned rockets and planned more ambitious
space missions.19 Because of the rapid scientific and technological
strides, the law of outer space had to develop quickly. 20 In response,
the United Nations established the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
18. See id. at 107; HURWITZ, supra note 12, at 153; JASENTULIYANA, supra note 9, at
325-26; REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 5, at 301.
19. MANFRED LACHS, THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE: AN EXPERIENCE IN CONTEMPORARY
LAW-MAKING 1-3 (1972).
20. See BIN CHENG, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 216-17 (1997).
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Outer Space (COPUOS) in 1959 to address the unique legal issues that
arise from space activities. 21 COPUOS's main goals were to promote
peaceful space activities, encourage cooperation, and establish a legal
regime.22
After eight years of debate, the Committee proposed the Outer
Space Treaty,23 which laid out a general framework for governing space
activities. 24 The treaty came into force in October 1968 and, as of
January 2006, 125 states have agreed to be bound by its terms. 25 In
1972, COPUOS added more details to the Outer Space Treaty's liability
provisions through the Liability Convention. 26 As of January 2006, 108
states follow the Liability Convention's regime. 27 To give more force to
these treaties, 28 in 1976 the Registration Convention set up a structure
for states to register and track spacecraft.29
In total, five treaties govern activities in outer space,30 while five
General Assembly non-binding resolutionS31 further clarify principles of
international law in outer space. 32 Despite the relative youth of space
law, several core concepts have crystallized into customary
21. International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, G.A. Res. 1472
(XIV), 1(a)(iii)(b), U.N. Doc. RES 1472(XIV) (Dec. 12, 1959); see DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR
& KoPAL, supra note 1, at 3.
22. Question of the Peaceful Use of Outer Space, G.A. Res. 1348 (XIII), U.N. Doc.
RES 1348(XIII) (Dec. 13, 1958); G.A. Res. 1472 (XIV), supra note 21. See also DIEDERIKS-
VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 23; JASENTULIYANA, supra note 9, at 2-3.
23. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18
U.S.T. 205, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
24. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 3; REYNOLDS &MERGES,
supra note 5, at 49. See CHENG, supra note 20, at 215-85, for a detailed account of the
drafting of the Outer Space Treaty.
25. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 23-24.
26. Convention on the International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects,
Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Liability Convention];
REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 5, at 178.
27. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 35.
28. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 44-45; REYNOLDS & MERGES,
supra note 5, at 204-05.
29. Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Sept. 15, 1976,
28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter Registration Convention].
30. Treaties cover the following topics: general principles, astronaut rescue, liability,
registration of space objects, and use of the Moon and other celestial bodies. Henry
Hertzfeld, The 'Law of Outer Space" is at a Crossroads: Current and Future Issues in
International Space Law, 15 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 325, 328-29 (2009).
31. These resolutions discuss: basic legal principles, direct broadcasting by satellites,
remote sensing, use of nuclear power sources, and how outer space benefits are to be used.
See JASENTULIYANA, supra note 9, at 41-50.
32. See CHENG, supra note 20, at 150-62; Stacey L. Lowder, Comment, A State's
International Legal Role: From the Earth to the Moon, 7 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 253,
254-57 (1999), for a thorough account of the development of space law from 1961 to the
present.
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international law through state practice.3 3 Customary international
law is state practice accepted as law. 34 It is a formative process where,
over time, states give certain customs the force of law.3 5 The customary
international laws relating to space are that space is governed by
international law;36 national appropriation in space is forbidden; 37
space and its resources are to be used for the benefit of humanity;38
states are responsible for their actions in space; 39 states are liable for
damage; 40 and space objects have free transit over a state's "subjacent
territory," meaning that a satellite may freely pass over a state's
territory so long as the satellite is in orbit. 41 These rules of customary
law, therefore, are binding on all states. 42
The Outer Space Treaty was a success partly because it was
drafted by blending science and jurisprudence. 43 Including scientists in
the drafting process helped form a legal framework that incorporated
technological necessities. 44  However, technological development
progresses quickly and the treaty-making process is slow. Drafters of
the space treaties, for example, could not have fathomed the drastic
increase in commercial space activities. 45 States, therefore, must now
increasingly rely these on informal principles, guided by the
aspirational documents, to govern their activities.
33. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 6, 11-12; LYALL & LARSON,
supra note 15, at 71.
34. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KoPAL, supra note 1, at 10; 1 OPPENHEIM'S
INTERNATIONAL LAW § 8, at 26 (R. Jennings & A. Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992) [hereinafter
OPPENHEIM].
35. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 11; OPPENHEIM, supra note
34, at 26.
36. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 23, art. III.
37. See id. art. II.
38. See, e.g., id. art. I.
39. See id. art. VI.
40. See, e.g., id. art. VII; Liability Convention, supra note 26, arts. II, III; LYALL &
LARSEN, supra note 15, at 71.
41. See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 15, at 54. "Subjacent transit" means that, for
example, satellites in orbit may freely pass over territory of a state without permission.
Although seemingly necessary for effective space activities given the vast number of
states a satellite in orbit transit, this legal principle is opposite of the analogy from air
law. Aircraft need a state's permission to transit another sovereign's airspace.
DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 6; Joseph A. Bosco, International Law
Regarding Outer Space - An Overview, 55 J. AIR L. & COM. 609, 620 (1990).
42. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 10; V.S. Vershchetin &
G.M. Danilenko, Custom as a Source of International Law of Outer Space, 13 J. SPACE L.
22, 23-24 (1985).
43. See Jay H. Ginsburg, The High Frontier: Tort Claims and Liability for Damages
Caused by Man-Made Space Objects, 12 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 515, 532 (1989).
44. See id. at 534.
45. See Frakes, supra note 7, at 422-23.
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Space law, fundamentally, is a specialized body of law within
international law. 46  Sources of space law are the same as other
international law: treaties, customary international law, general
principles of international law, and scholarly writing and judicial
decisions.4 7  However, "an automatic extension to outer space and
celestial bodies of international law" would not work because
international law does not address all the unique challenges posed by
outer space. 48 In the 1960s and 1970s, states cobbled together a legal
framework for space based on analogous principles from other
specialized bodies of law, such as maritime and air law,4 9 international
law in general when possible,50 and crafted new rules when not.5 1 For
example, the concept that a state has exclusive sovereignty over its
airspace 52 was discarded in favor of allowing satellites free transit over
a state's territory. 53
In contrast, other lex specialis, notably admiralty law, developed
incrementally over several centuries as trade practices formed to
resolve business disputes, which were eventually formalized into
modern maritime law. 54 Air law developed much faster; however, its
founding documents are more specialized.5 5  Regardless, no great
declaration of principles paved the way for either body of law. Space
law, on the other hand, started afresh at the international level with
broad declarations of principles. 56
B. Rules of the Road: Informal Law
Despite the number of treaties and resolutions governing outer
space, space law is not as formal as other areas of international law. 5
46. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 5; LYALL & LARSEN, supra
note 15, at 2.
47. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 33 U.N.T.S.
993; see DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 5-7; LYALL & LARSEN, supra
note 15, at 31-32.
48. LACHS, supra note 19, at 15 (internal quotation marks omitted).
49. See REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 5, at 27-28.
50. See LACHS, supra note 19, at 15; Hertzfeld, supra note 30, at 327 (listing sources
and inspirations for space law principles).
51. See LACHS, supra note 19, at 15 n.9.
52. See Convention on International Civil Aviation art. 1, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180,
15 U.N.T.S. 295 (declaring that states have exclusive sovereignty over their airspace).
53. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 6; LYALL & LARSEN, supra
note 15, at 54; Bosco, supra note 41, at 620.
54. Admiralty law grew out of technical necessities reflected by early trade law. In
Britain, the complexities of admiralty law eventually led to the creation of specialized
maritime tribunals. This process took centuries. Ginsburg, supra note 43, at 518-19.
55. See id. at 520-24.
56. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 5; JASENTULIYANA, supra
note 9, at 1.
57. Hertzfeld, supra note 30, at 331.
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In place of international law, many space activities are governed by
codes of conduct and best practice guidelines drafted by "national
agencies and professional experts."5 8 Because of the law's informality,
disputes are resolved diplomatically or, for licenses or contract disputes,
in national courts.59 States, however, generally abide by international
principles regarding space.60 This informalism can be traced to the
same issues that influenced early space treaties: a rapidly changing
technological field and a focus on idealism in the law.
The excitement of the Space Race was tempered by the lurking fear
that space was to be the next battlefield for the Cold War. 61 The
driving issues of the 1960s and 1970s framed the debate about space
law, which is reflected in the foundational documents. 62 Nuclear
weapons were on the forefront of drafters' minds. 63 Conflict in the final
frontier was not out of the question. Therefore, space law documents
are written with highly aspirational goals 64 such as space being the
"province of mankind" and that space resources are most efficiently
used when used cooperatively. 65 International cooperation is a
principle found in all space treaties and statements of principles.6 6 All
of the space treaties were drafted within COPUOS using the consensus
method. Because the treaties were not opened for signature until all
the drafting states reached consensus, this encouraged compliance with
the rules once the treaties entered into force.6 7 Despite all states not
being satisfied on every issue, space law as a whole is stronger because
there are no reservations detracting from the consistency of the law.
58. Gerardine Meishan Goh, Softly, Softly Catchee Monkey: Informalism and the
Quiet Development of International Space Law, 87 NEB. L. REV. 725, 726 (2009); see also
JASENTULIYAYA, supra note 9, at 5-14.
59. This explains why there is so little litigation on the finer points of "space law."
See Hertzfeld, supra note 30, at 331.
60. See Goh, supra note 58, at 729-30.
61. See REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 5, at 195; Hertzfeld, supra note 30, at 327.
62. See REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 5, at 71; Hertzfeld, supra note 30, at 327.
63. See REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 5, at 71; Hertzfeld, supra note 30, at 327-28.
64. See Goh, supra note 58, at 731-32; Myres S. McDougal & Leon S. Lipson,
Perspectives for a Law of Outer Space, 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 407, 429-30 (1958).
65. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KoPAL, supra note 1, at 23; JASENTULYANA, supra
note 9, at 1; Hertzfeld, supra note 30, at 327-28. See also, e.g., Outer Space Treaty, supra
note 23, arts. I, II, IX ("States ... shall conduct all their activities ... with due regard to
the corresponding interest of all other States Parties to the Treaty.").
66. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 23; Hertzfeld, supra note
30, at 327-28; Chukeat Noichim, International Cooperation for Sustainable Space
Development, 31 J. SPACE L. 315, 324 (2005).
67. See JASENTULIYANA, supra note 9, at 215; Ginsburg, supra note 43, at 534.
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II. CREATING LIABILITY IN OUTER SPACE
A. Developing Outer Space Liability
The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space began exploring the problem of liability for space activities in
1958.68 The negotiations wavered between the Soviet position that a
space liability treaty would be superfluous, given liability rules existing
in international law, and the desire for states without space operations
to see a treaty that guaranteed prompt, equitable compensation.69 To
give COPUOS guidance on crafting a liability regime, the General
Assembly passed a resolution declaring that states "bear international
responsibility" for space activities and are liable for damage caused by
their space actives. 70  The General Assembly's guidance, made
immediate by the first controlled landing on the Moon by the Soviet
Union's Luna-9, spurred the Soviet Union and United States into
agreeing to codify basic space law principles in the Outer Space
Treaty.71
Drafters also disagreed about what would qualify as "damage" for
liability purposes. The dispute centered on (1) the types of protected
interests, (2) the type of conduct giving rise to liability, (3) whether a
different principle should govern in space and on Earth, (4) the extent
of the launching state's liability, and (5) whether joint and several
liability was appropriate. 72 The Outer Space Treaty briefly addressed
several of these issues, 73 but not in a comprehensive manner. 74
B. Liability Convention: Providing Further Clarification
When the Liability Convention entered into force in 1972,75 it
expanded and clarified the Outer Space Treaty's liability regime.76 The
68. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 3; REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra
note 5, at 49; Ginsburg, supra note 43, at 537. See generally CHENG, supra note 20, at
215-85 (discussing the negotiations and provisions of the 1967 Space Treaty and the 1968
Astronauts Agreement).
69. CHENG, supra note 20, at 289.
70. G.A. Res. 1962 (XVIII) 1 5, 8, U.N. Doe. A/RES/1962(XVIII) (Dec. 13, 1963).
71. See CHENG, supra note 20, at 291.
72. See Carl Q. Christol, The Legal Common Heritage of Mankind: Capturing an
Illusive Concept and Applying it to World Needs, in 18 COLLOQUIUM ON L. OF OUTER
SPACE 42, 52-53 (1976).
73. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 23, arts. VI, VII (establishing state responsibility
for the actions of state and non-governmental entities and establishing international
liability for damage in outer space, airspace, and on the surface).
74. See MORRIS D. FORKOSCH, OUTER SPACE AND LEGAL LIABILITY 49, 54 (1982).
75. Liability Convention, supra note 26, at 188.
76. See HURWITZ, supra note 12, at 10; JASENTULIYANA, supra note 9, at 324.
694 VOL. 40:4
THE TROUBLE WITH WESTPHALIA IN SPACE
treaties generally work together.77 When there is a conflict, however,
the rules of treaty interpretation suggest that the Liability Convention
supplants conflicting provisions in the Outer Space Treaty.78 The
impetus for drafting the Convention was primarily a concern for
damage caused by space objects to individuals and property on Earth.79
This focus, while understandably important, left the question of liability
for damage in space unclear.80
Understanding the liability regime for space must first start with
understanding important terms used in space law. The Liability
Convention establishes a claims process, which lays out a state may
recover damages. Claims differ based on whether the incident
happened in space or on Earth's surface. If liability attaches, the
injured state is entitled to compensations. Launching states, however,
can limit their liability or exonerate themselves completely if certain
criteria are met.
1. Important Terminology
Before moving to what constitutes a claim under the Liability
Convention, it is important to define certain terms used throughout.
Space law has several important concepts on which the rest of the body
of law is built.
Liability in space law is predicated on harm inflicted by a "space
object."8 1 However, the Liability Convention inconveniently does a poor
job laying out what exactly is a "space object." 82 Under the Convention,
a "space object includes component parts of a space object as well as its
launch vehicle and parts thereof."83 These "component parts" include
anything normally regarded as components of a spacecraft; for example,
cowlings from rockets, fuel tanks, an astronaut's glove, dropped
77. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 147. But see HURWITZ,
supra note 12, at 10 (noting that this is not true if all states involved are not party to both
treaties).
78. This assumes that claims are brought between states party to both treaties.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 30(3), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331;
Stanton Eigenbrodt, Out to Launch: Private Remedies for Outer Space Claims, 55 J. AIR L.
& CoM. 185, 193 (1989).
79. DeBusschere, supra note 8, at 100; Christopher D. Williams, Space: The Cluttered
Frontier, 60 J. AIR L. & COM. 1139, 1157 (1995).
80. See HURWITZ, supra note 12, at 11; Williams, supra note 79, at 1157. Cf.
REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 5, at 178 (explaining that the Liability Convention
provides for liability where space objects are damaged elsewhere than on the surface of
the earth).
81. Liability Convention, supra note 26, arts. II, III; HOWARD A. BAKER, SPACE
DEBRIS: LEGAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 62 (1989); DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL,
supra note 1, at 37.
82. See CHENG, supra note 20, at 324-26.
83. Liability Convention, supra note 26, art. I(d) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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wrenches, paint chips, and lost bolts. 84  Natural objects, such as
meteorites, are not included in this definition.8 5
It is unclear where the line is drawn between a launch vehicle
space object and something else.8 6 Must a space object be intended for
space, or can it merely facilitate a launch? Are spacecraft built in orbit
space objects? The Liability Convention leaves these questions
unanswered.87 Regardless of the definition, states cannot abandon a
space object.88 Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty says that states
"shall retain jurisdiction and control over such objects."8 9
Who can make a claim is a vestige of the Westphalian system and
is defined by the treaties. In most disputes, there will be two parties:
the "claimant" state and the "launching" state. Each is defined
relatively specifically in space law. Taking the claimant state first,
there can be three possible states: (1) the state, or its natural person,
suffering damage (natural state); (2) the state in which the damage
occurred (territorial state); and (3) the state whose permanent residence
suffered harm (state of permanent residence).9 o Under the second and
third possibilities, a state makes a claim on behalf of an individual
whose state did not chose to assert its rights9 1-befitting a victim-
oriented regime. 92 Although the Liability Convention seems to put
claimant states in the hierarchy listed, a lower-ordered state is not
prohibited from making a claim. 93 But, if no state chooses to advance
an individual's claim, that individual has no recourse in international
law.94 However, to mitigate the negative effects of the state-centric
system, the injured party may pursue a claim in municipal courts. 9
84. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 9; HURWITZ, supra note 12,
at 24-25; LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 15, at 86; Merges & Reynolds, supra note 11, at
10010.
85. BAKER, supra note 81, at 62; DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at
37.
86. See CHENG, supra note 20, at 325.
87. See id.; HURwITZ, supra note 12, at 23.
88. JASENTULIYANA, supra note 9, at 204-05; LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 15, at 67.
89. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 23, art. VIII.
90. Liability Convention, supra note 26, art. VIII. See also CHENG, supra note 20, at
307; LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 15, at 111. Consider this hypothetical: a Swiss
national, legally residing in Colombia, is injured at a Kazakh spaceport by an American
company's rocket. Three states may assert a claim for this individual: Switzerland, as his
national state; Kazakhstan, as the state having territorial jurisdiction over the location of
the injury; and Colombia, as his state of legal permanent residence.
91. Liability Convention, supra note 26, art. VIII; HURWITZ, supra note 12, at 49-50.
92. CHENG, supra note 20, at 307.
93. Id.
94. HURWlTZ, supra note 12, at 50. See also Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co.
(Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 70 (Feb. 5); Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J.
4, 13 (Apr. 6); MARK WESTON JANIS & JOHN E. NOYES, INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND
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The launching state is more straightforward because the
definitions in the Outer Space Treaty96 and the Liability Convention97
have been interpreted to mean the same thing.9 8 There are four
possible launching states: (1) the state that launches the space object;
(2) the state that procures the launching; (3) the state from whose
territory the launch happens; and (4) the state from whose facilities the
launch happens.9 9 These definitions work if a state successfully inserts
a space object into outer space. If the launch fails, however, the state
remains responsible. 100 Drafters had seen many failed launches, which
is the most dangerous part of the process, and it would be unreasonable
for a failed launch to vitiate liability. A technicality would not excuse
liability for any damage. 101
Because there can be multiple states responsible for damages, they
are jointly and severally liable to the victim. 102 "Joint and several"
liability means that victims may pursue a claim against, and recover
from any one culpable state, regardless of the culpability of other
states. 103 Drafters contemplated two situations giving rise to joint and
several liability:104 (1) when damage is caused to a third party as a
result of a collision between other states' space objects' 05 and (2) when
damage is caused by a space object with more than one launching
state. 106 In these cases, the state paying damages may seek
indemnification from the other jointly responsible state-although it is
unclear how the liability is apportioned. 107
COMMENTARY 373 (4th ed. 2011) (explaining that individuals generally cannot assert
claims under international law; that is the purview of states).
95. See Liability Convention, supra note 26, art. XI; HURWITZ, supra note 12, at 52.
96. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 23, art. VII.
97. Liability Convention, supra note 26, art. I(c).
98. See CHENG, supra note 20, at 309-10; LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 15, at 86.
99. See CHENG, supra note 20, at 309-10; DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra
note 1, at 35-36; LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 15, at 86.
100. Liability Convention, supra note 26, art. I(b); HURWITZ, supra note 12, at 20-21.
101. HURWITZ, supra note 12, at 20-21.
102. Liability Convention, supra note 26, arts. IV, V. See also CHENG, supra note 12,
at 329; DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 38; HURWITZ, supra note 12, at
37.
103. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 10 (2000). See also
DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 36; HURWITZ, supra note 12, at 37.
104. See CHENG, supra note 20, at 328-31; JASENTULIYANA, supra note 9, at 36.
105. Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal Subcomm, 9th Sess., 149th
mtg. at 83, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/C.2/SR/132-51 (July 29, 1980). This was addressed by the
Liability Convention, supra note 26, art. IV.
106. Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal Subcomm. Rep. on its 9th
Sess., June 8 - July 3, 1970, at 8, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/85 (July 3, 1970). This was
addressed by the Liability Convention, supra note 25, art. V.
107. See Liability Convention, supra note 26, art. V; HURWITZ, supra note 12, at 38.
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2. Making a Claim
The Liability Convention is a tool for resolving international
disputes.10 8  Consequently, as an international tool based on the
Westphalian system, only states may assert claims.m Unique to space
law,1 10 however, is that a state is responsible for "national activities in
outer space, regardless of whether . . . those activities are conducted by
government or private entities."111 Therefore, an injured private entity
must petition its government to make a claim on its behalf. 112
The space treaties encourage diplomatic solutions to disputes.113
The Outer Space Treaty calls on states to "undertake appropriate
international consultations" before conducting activities that could
potentially impact other states.114  Parties can also use dispute
resolution mechanisms provided in other international organizations;
for example, a dispute about spectrum allocation for space
communication would be best resolved by the International
Telecommunication Union.115  However, if there is no diplomatic
solution within one year of the filing of a claim, then either state may
request that a Claims Commission be formed. 116 The process for
initiating a claim 117 and forming the Claims Commission" 8 is laid out
in the Liability Convention, but the Commission operates like an
arbitration tribunal." 9 It renders an award based on international law
that also takes "principles of justice and equity" into account.120
108. The Liability Convention does not "apply to damage caused by a space object of a
launching state to: (a) nationals of that state; [or] (b) foreign nationals" participating in
the operation of that space object. Liability Convention, supra note 26, art. VII; see also
CHENG, supra note 20, at 308.
109. See Liability Convention, supra note 26, art. VIII (describing how a state may
make a claim); Eigenbrodt, supra note 78, at 196.
110. States traditionally bear no responsibility for the actions of nationals. See LYALL
& LARSEN, supra note 15, at 66.
111. Williams, supra note 79, at 1153. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 23, art. VI;
IAN BROWNLIE, SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS: STATE RESPONSIBILITY (PART 1) 165-66
(1983); DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 36.
112. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 36, 107-08;
JASENTULIYANA, supra note 9, at 325-26.
113. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 40; JASENTULIYANA, supra
note 9, at 220; LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 15, at 112.
114. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 23, art. IX; JASENTULIYANA, supra note 9, at
218.
115. See JASENTULIYANA, supra note 9, at 216-17.
116. See Liability Convention, supra note 26, art. XIV; LYALL & LARSEN, supra note
15, at 112.
117. See Liability Convention, supra note 26, arts. VIII-X.
118. See id. arts. XV-XX.
119. See id. art. XII; LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 15, at 112; Eigenbrodt, supra note
78, at 198-99.
120. Liability Convention, supra note 26, art. XII. See also LYALL & LARSEN, supra
note 15, at 113.
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However, awards are "recommendatory" unless the parties agree to be
bound by them. 121
If a party needs more certainty than the Liability Convention's
claims process can provide, the treaty structure allows injured parties
to assert claims in other venues. 122 Injured parties do not need to
exhaust municipal remedies before asserting a claim under the Liability
Convention, although they may not simultaneously pursue a claim in
multiple venues.123 This is consistent with the Liability Convention's
victim-oriented approach. 124
3. Location Matters: The Different Liability Schemes
The extent to which a state is responsible for damage depends on
where the damage occurred. If the damage was done on the Earth's
surface or in airspace, a state is held absolutely liable for damage.125 If
damage is done in outer space, including on celestial bodies, the state is
liable under a fault-based regime.126
i. Earth-based Damage
If a space object causes damage "on the surface of the earth or to
aircraft in flight," the launching state is absolutely liable for damage. 127
Article II of the Liability Convention addresses the drafters' concern for
damage done on Earth's surface-the standard is clear and
responsibility is relatively easy to determine.128 Additionally, the
absolute liability standard reflects the ultra-hazardous nature of space
activities. 129 This doctrine of "dangerous things" properly puts the
burden of ensuring safety on the launching state because of the complex
nature of launches, the difficulty third parties have avoiding a launched
121. See Liability Convention, supra note 26, art. XIX(2); DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR &
KOPAL, supra note 1, at 40-41.
122. For example, the injured party can use dispute resolution mechanisms provided
in other treaties, arbitration, or domestic courts. See Liability Convention, supra note 26,
arts. IX, XI; JASENTULIYANA, supra note 9, at 216-17; HURWITZ, supra note 12, at 75.
123. See Liability Convention, supra note 26, art. XI(1); HURWITZ, supra note 12, at 52.
124. See HURWITZ, supra note 12, at 10, 84 n.19, 207; Bosco, supra note 41, at 617.
125. Liability Convention, supra note 26, art. II.
126. Id. art. III.
127. Id. art. II.
128. See DeBusschere, supra note 8, at 100; Williams, supra note 79, at 1157. Cf.
REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 5, at 49 (explaining that negotiators did not know what
to expect from space activities; therefore, planning a legal regime to govern unexpected
events could lead to incomplete law).
129. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KoPAL, supra note 1, at 37; JASENTULIYANA, supra
note 9, at 35 n.40; LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 15, at 108; Ginsburg, supra note 43, at
516.
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space object, and because the launching state can best control the
circumstances surrounding launch.130
ii. Space-based Damage
If damage, however, occurs "elsewhere than on the surface of the
earth to a space object," the launching state is liable only if the damage
is the state's fault.13 1 Fault-based liability places the burden on states
to avoid collisions in orbit.132 This assumes states have a mutual
interest in protecting their space assets as well as the technological
capability to take preventative measures. 133 Some satellites, however,
cannot perform collision avoidance maneuvers and others are too small
to easily track.134 Unlike the doctrine of "dangerous things," the risks
are potentially easier to control in space. Although some space objects
can neither be tracked nor moved, states are more likely to be able to
avoid damage.135 To establish liability through space law, a claimant
must show (1) that the space object belongs to the responsible state and
(2) the damage was "caused by" that space object. 3 6
4. Fault and Causation
First, the space object must be attributable to a particular
launching state, which requires that the space object be identified.137
But the Liability Convention does not provide a method to identify the
state responsible for the errant space object.138  The Registration
Convention, however, is part of the legal structure that facilitates the
finding of fault by requiring states to register their space objects so that
the objects can be identified later, should a collision occur.' 39 However,
neither the Outer Space Treaty nor the Liability Convention base
liability on whether a space objects listed in the registry.140 Assuming
the space object causing the damage is identified and the launching
130. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 37; HURWITZ, supra note
12, at 28, 30; LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 15, at 108.
131. Liability Convention, supra note 26, art. III.
132. See HURWITZ, supra note 12, at 34.
133. Id.
134. See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 15, at 297.
135. See HURWITZ, supra note 12, at 34.
136. See JASENTULIYANA, supra note 9, at 202.
137. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 23, art. VIII (stating that space objects
remain under the jurisdiction and control of the launching state).
138. JASENTULIYANA, supra note 9, at 326.
139. See Registration Convention, supra note 29, art. IV; DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR &
KoPAL, supra note 1, at 44-45; Ginsburg, supra note 43, at 544.
140. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 46; JASENTULIYANA, supra note
9, at 326-27.
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state is at fault, it is then responsible for the damage. If there is no
fault, liability does not attach. 141
Proposals to include a broad definition of damage, however, were
rebuffed.142 Some scholars argue it is improper to read liability for
indirect damages into the treaties because indirect damages are not tied
directly to the event creating liability. 14 3
However, identifying the launching state of a space object is
extremely difficult.144 First, these international space registries are
neither up to date nor consolidated. 14 5 States often fail to register older
space objects or smaller component parts. 146 Second, some space objects
are extremely small and cannot be tracked. 147 Debris or trash, for
example, is often far too small to track. Yet, as with the Space Shuttle
Challenger's windshield, tiny debris can cause significant damage,
especially to astronauts on spacewalks.148 If the party responsible for
damage cannot be identified, liability cannot be assigned.14 9
After the responsible state has been identified, the state must then
be found liable for causing the damage. The problem with the space law
liability regime is that there is no standard of care against which a
state's conduct can be measured.150 This is a fundamental flaw in the
Liability Convention 15 ' because fault cannot be measured without the
yardstick of standard of care.152 Several theories, however, have been
put forward. 153
One proposal suggests that fault should be based on a state's
objective intent because liability for a breach merely restates
141. See HURWITZ, supra note 12, at 36; DeBusschere, supra note 7, at 102-03.
142. Aldo Armando Cocca, From Full Compensation to Total Responsibility, 27
COLLOQUIUM ON L. OF OUTER SPACE 157, 158 (1984).
143. See, e.g., Edward R. Finch, Jr., Outer Space Liability: Past, Present, and Future,
14 INT'L LAW. 123, 126 (1980).
144. Williams, supra note 79, at 1158.
145. See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 15, at 89.
146. See JASENTULIYANA, supra note 9, at 327.
147. See Merges & Reynolds, supra note 11, at 10010.
148. BAKER, supra note 81, at 11.
149. See HURWITZ, supra note 12, at 36.
150. See BAKER, supra note 81, at 84; JASENTULIYANA, supra note 9, at 323; Williams,
supra note 79, at 1159-60.
151. See BAKER, supra note 81, at 84; Williams, supra note 79, at 1159-60.
152. See Robert F. Stamps, Orbital Debris: An International Agreement is Needed, 32
COLLOQUIUM ON L. OF OUTER SPACE 152, 154 (1990) ("In order to establish whether a
State is at fault for a collision . . . there must first be an accepted standard of care for
traffic in outer space, and a breach of that standard of care.").
153. For example, Nandasiri Jasentuliyana, the Director of the United Nation's Office
for Outer Space Affairs and President of the International Institute of Space Law, has
called for an expert panel to develop appropriate standards for space activities. See
JASENTULIYANA, supra note 9, at 208.
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international law. 154  If fault attached at an objective breach of
international law, a state would be free to act however it wanted to,
unless there is an international law prohibiting the act. 155 The
"reasonableness" of a state's action, on the other hand, is predicated on
the foreseeability of the damage.156 Given the difficulty of tracking
satellites and the environmental uncertainties in space, it is difficult to
foresee all circumstances when a space object can be damaged.15 7 As it
stands now, adjudicators will have to find analogies in other areas of
international law and municipal law to determine the appropriate
standard of care. 158
Another argument, however, centers on causation. In order for
fault to attach, there must be a causal connection between a state's
action and the damage suffered.15 9 Scholars argue the "caused by"
language in the Liability Convention merely requires a connection
between the accident and the damage.' 6 This conforms with the
liability structure laid out by the German American Mixed Claims
Commission after World War I. Under international law "it matters not
how many links there may be in the chain of causation . . . provided
there is no break in the chain" and the loss can be traced "link by link"
to the wrongful action.16 Allowing causation to flow through a series of
related links from the initial proximate cause is befitting a victim-
oriented recovery regime. 6 2
Another model comes from the Permanent Court of Arbitration. In
2011, the Court created Optional Rules for Disputes Relating to Outer
Space Activities, which parties may use to resolve outer space
disputes.163 Article 27 establishes that each party has the burden of
154. See BROWNLIE, supra note 111, at 38-40.
155. See S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 44 (Sept. 7); see also
Ginsburg, supra note 43, at 537.
156. See CARL Q. CHRISTOL, MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER SPACE 96 (1982).
157. Cf. S.E. Doyle, Reentering Space Objects: Facts and Fiction, 6 J. SPACE L. 107, 110
(1978) (describing the inherent difficulties in predicting a dead satellite's trajectory).
158. See FORKOSCH, supra note 74, at 81; JASENTULIYANA, supra note 9, at 208.
159. Carl Q. Christol, International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 74
AM. J. INT'L L. 346, 361 (1980).
160. CHRISTOL, supra note 156, at 97.
161. Administrative Decision No. II (U.S. v. Ger.), 7 R.I.A.A. 23, 29-30 (Ger.-U.S.
Mixed Claims Comm'n 1923), available at http://untreaty.un.org/cod/riaalcases/vol_VII/23-
32.pdf.
162. See Christol, supra note 159, at 351.
163. PCA Adopts New Rules of Procedure, PERMANENT CT. OF ARB. (Dec. 6, 2011),
http://www.pca-cpa.org/shownews.asp?nws~id=323&pag-id=1261&ac=view.
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proving their own claims. 164 This requirement grants tribunals "broad
discretion" to determine claims "in light of justice and equity."165
5. Compensation
Space law operates under the principle of full, restorative
compensation. 166 Article XII of the Liability Convention declares that
compensation will be determined according to international law and
principles of justice and equity. 16 7 The reparation will restore the
damaged person, entity, or state "to the condition which would have
existed if the damage had not occurred."1 68 This article reiterates16 9 the
rule of customary international law articulated in the Chorzow Factory
case. 170
The nature and extent of recoverable damages, however, has not
been precisely determined. Direct damage is recoverable.1 71 However,
indirect damage-lost profit or mental suffering-is not expressly
mentioned in the Convention. 172 Some argue that indirect damages can
be recovered through proximate causation.173 International tribunals
and agreements have allowed indirect damages, so long as the damage
can be attributed to the state's wrongful act.174 Others, however, note
that it is best to use a direct damage model because the connection
between the wrongful act and the indirect damage is often too
tenuous.175 Additionally, the Liability Convention provides no clear
guidance and a staggering amount of indirect damage could potentially
be attributed to a state. 176 For example, in 2005, Canada expressed
164. Permanent Court of Arbitration, OPTIONAL RULES FOR ARBITRATION OF DISPUTES
RELATING TO OUTER SPACE ACTIVITIES, art. 27, available at http://www.pca-
cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil id=1774.
165. Christol, supra note 159, at 361.
166. See Ginsburg, supra note 43, at 540-41.
167. Liability Convention, supra note 26, art. XII.
168. Id.
169. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 38-39; Eigenbrodt, supra
note 78, at 194-95.
170. Chorzow Factory Case (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 47 (Sept. 13)
("[Rieparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and
re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not
been committed.").
171. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 38-9; HURwITZ, supra note
12, at 13-14.
172. See HURWITZ, supra note 12, at 12-14; REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 5, at 188.
173. See CHENG, supra note 20, at 323. This includes "loss of profits, interruption of
business activities, reasonable costs for repairs or medical expenses, loss of services of a
third party, or other damages." See Ginsburg, supra note 43, at 539-40.
174. See, e.g., Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (Trail Smelter
Arb. Trib., 1938 & 1941). See also HURWITZ, supra note 12, at 16-18.
175. See HURWITZ, supra note 12, at 16.
176. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 38-39; Eigenbrodt, supra note
78, at 195 (explaining that, while indirect damages are recoverable in the United States,
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concern that a Titan IV rocket booster launched from Cape Canaveral
would fall near an oil platform in Newfoundland. Evacuating the
platform would have been an arduous process, costing $250 million. If
the spent booster did not hit the platform, the Liability Convention
would not apply. If, however, the booster hit the platform, it is unclear
whether Canada could claim lost profits. The uncertainty of what
constitutes damages under the space liability regime counsels parties
seeking more certainty to resort to municipal law. 177
6. Limiting Liability and Exoneration
The Liability Convention generally does not allow parties to
exonerate themselves from properly attributed absolute liability.178
Although this situation has yet to arise, the Liability Convention allows
a state to reduce its liability when the injured state acted recklessly and
contributed to the damage.179 In order to exonerate itself from absolute
liability, the launching state must show that the damage "resulted
either wholly or partially from gross negligence or from an act or
omission done with the intent to cause damage on the part of the
claimant State."180 This blurs the line between absolute and fault-
based liability by allowing the launching state to reduce its liability
because of the claimant's negligence. 181 However, this exemption is
tempered by Article VI(2), which forbids exoneration if the launching
state acted contrary to international law.182 These rare situations
where a state can limit its liability again reflect the Liability
Convention's victim-oriented recovery scheme. 183
III. SPACE LAw LIABILITY V. INTERNATIONAL LAW LIABILITY
Space law, unlike space objects, does not operate in a vacuum. The
space treaties are not universally accepted and the nuances of liability
claims have not become customary international law binding on all
states. Nor do they address every dispute that may arise in outer
space. The space treaties, however, added to an already established
the Soviet Union measured damages based on "societal costs such as hospitalization,
schools, and State pensions rather than personal loss.").
177. See Eigenbrodt, supra note 78, at 196; Ginsburg, supra note 43, at 540.
178. Liability Convention, supra note 26, art. VI. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KoPAL,
supra note 1, at 38; LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 32, at 110.
179. Liability Convention, supra note 26, art. VI; DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL,
supra note 1, at 38; FORKOSCH, supra note 74, at 81; HURWITZ, supra note 11, at 40.
180. Liability Convention, supra note 26, art. VI(1); DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KoPAL,
supra note 1, at 38.
181. HURWITZ, supra note 12, at 41.
182. Liability Convention, supra note 26, art. VI(2) (mentioning specifically the United
Nations Charter and the Outer Space Treaty as sources of international law). See
DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 38.
183. See HURWITZ, supra note 12, at 40; Bosco, supra note 41, at 617.
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framework for solving international disputes. In this sense, the space
treaties are built on top of the more established, yet less precise,
Westphalian state system.
This section outlines the general international law on state
responsibility and international liability, which fill the gaps left by the
space liability regime. It then discusses the major difference between
the general international law and space law liability regimes. Finally,
the section tries to answer the question of which regime states should
use.
A. Liability Under International Law
There are two different concepts governing restitution for injury to
other states: state responsibility and international liability. Both deal
with compensating the victim for harm, but they are triggered in
different ways. Unfortunately, the concepts of responsibility and
liability have often been confused and switched.184 When the
International Law Commission (ILC) debated state responsibility, they
discussed "[i]nternational liability for injurious consequences arising
out of acts not prohibited by international law." 185 This, as Brownlie
points out, was inappropriate because state responsibility deals only
with wrongful acts.186 The ILC, however, did not resolve this confusion
until 2001.187 Consequently, the space treaties seemingly use "liability"
and "responsibility" interchangeably. 8 This confusion is exacerbated
because French and Spanish, two official languages of the United
Nations, use the same word to describe both concepts. 189
The simplest way to distinguish these concepts is to note that state
responsibility arises due to a breach of an international obligation.
International liability, on the other hand, arises when one state harms
another; no breach of a duty is necessary. State responsibility is tied to
a wrongful act of state; liability is triggered by harm.
184. See Frans G. von der Dunk, Liability Versus Responsibility in Space Law:
Misconception or Misconstruction?, in 34 COLLOQUIUM ON THE L. OF OUTER SPACE 363,
363 (1991).
185. BROWNLIE, supra note 111, at 49 (internal quotation marks omitted).
186. See id. at 49-50.
187. See JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S ARTICLES ON
STATE RESPONSIBILITY 75-76 (2002).
188. See BROWNLIE, supra note 111, at 50; HURWITZ, supra note 12, at 148-49; von der
Dunk, supra note 184, at 363.
189. See HURWITZ, supra note 12, at 148; von der Dunk, supra note 184, at 363.
French and Spanish, both official United Nations languages, use "responsabilit6" and
"responsabilidad," respectively, to capture the idea of state responsibility and
international liability.
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1. State Responsibility
State responsibility is a law of obligations.190  It holds states
responsible for "internationally wrongful acts" done against another
state or its citizens.191 This allows an injured state to protect its
citizens from abuses by other states. 192 In order for state responsibility
to arise, the responsible state must commit an internationally wrongful
act that is properly attributable to the breaching state. 93  An
internationally wrongful act is either an act or omission attributable to
a state under international law or a breach of a state's international
obligation. 194
An act is attributable to a state only if the act was committed by
the state or has the state's authorization. 9 5 Private acts are almost
never attributable to states. 96
The breach of an international duty, properly attributed to a state,
triggers the secondary obligation to make reparations for injury caused
by the breach. 97 Reparation follows the Chorzow principle, 98 which
seeks to wipe away the harm caused by the responsible state.199
Reparation can, theoretically, be made in three ways: first, as state can
undo the wrong that caused the injury;200 if that is not possible,
monetary compensation is an acceptable substitute; 201 finally, if the
harm is non-monetary, satisfying the injured party by way of apology or
official recognition will count as reparation. 202
190. See CRAWFORD, supra note 187, at 77; Sompong Sucharitkul, State Responsibility
and International Liability Under International Law, 18 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 821,
828 (1996); von der Dunk, supra note 184, at 363.
191. See BROWNLIE, supra note 111, at 23; von der Dunk, supra note 184, at 363.
192. See Sucharitkul, supra note 190, at 823.
193. See BROWNLIE, supra note 111, at 36; CRAWFORD, supra note 187, at 81; von der
Dunk, supra note 184, at 363.
194. See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment (U.S. v.
Iran), 1980 I.C.J. Rep. 3, 61-68 (May 24) (holding that states can incur responsibility
for an individual's acts if the state fails to exercise "due care" in preventing private acts
that breach an international obligation); BROWNLIE, supra 111, at 30; CRAWFORD, supra
note 187, at 81; von der Dunk, supra note 184, at 363-64.
195. See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980
I.C.J. Rep. 3, $ 80; BROWNLIE, supra note 111, at 36; CRAWFORD, supra note 187, at 94,
100; von der Dunk, supra note 184, at 364.
196. BROWNLIE, supra note 111, at 165; von der Dunk, supra note 184, at 364.
197. CRAWFORD, supra note 187, at 201; Sucharitkul, supra note 190, at 825.
198. CRAWFORD, supra note 187, at 201-02; von der Dunk, supra note 184, at 364.
199. Factory at Chorzow (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 29 (Sept. 13).
200. BROWNLIE, supra note 111, at 210-12; von der Dunk, supra note 184, at 364.
201. BROWNLIE, supra note 111, at 222-24; von der Dunk, supra note 184, at 364.
202. BROWNLIE, supra note 111, at 208-09; von der Dunk, supra note 184, at 364.
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2. International Liability
International liability arises when a state injures an entity beyond
its jurisdiction through an act that is not internationally wrongful.203
This rule is an offshoot of state responsibility, 204 which forbids states
from actively harming their neighbors and requires states to prevent
harm in neighboring territories. 205 States are required to exercise "due
care" to prevent such harm. 206 This standard, however, is poorly
defined and rings hollow because it is not adequately defined. 207 The
ILC, when debating international liability, did not address the standard
of care and tied liability to harm; therefore, if harm occurs, the duty has
been violated.208 Therefore, a state can be liable for acts that are,
subjectively, not its fault.209
If a state is held liable for damage, it must pay compensation for
that damage. 210 This differs from state responsibility's "reparation"
because compensation merely requires that the liability be removed by
repairing the damage-there is no requirement to put the individual in
the same place he would be had the harm not occurred and no punitive
damages.211 Holding a wrongdoer responsible for harm inflicted,
however, is ultimately a good thing because it deters states from acting
in a way that could harm another state.
B. Distinctions Between Space and Standard Liability
International law provides a general scheme for recovering for an
international wrong. The space liability regime was built on top of this
structure. Both, however, are products of a state-centric regime. The
Soviet Union, for example, thought the international legal structure in
place was sufficient to govern space activities. Drafters, however,
decided a specific regime would better serve the needs of states in
space. State responsibility and international liability, however, still
linger in the background to fill gaps left by the space treaties.
203. See CRAWFORD, supra note 187, at 75-76; Sucharitkul, supra note 190, at 828.
204. See HURWITZ, supra note 12, at 149; Special Rapporteur, Preliminary Report on
the International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited
by International Law, 11 19-21, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/344 (1980).
205. See, e.g., Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1938, 1963-65 (Trail
Smelter Arb. Trib. 1938 & 1941); Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9).
206. HURWITZ, supra note 12, at 147; von der Dunk, supra note 184, at 365.
207. See BROWNLIE, supra note 111, at 49-50.
208. See HURWITZ, supra note 12, at 151; von der Dunk, supra note 184, at 365.
209. See von der Dunk, supra note 184, at 365.
210. Id. at 364.
211. N.L.J.T. Horbach, The Confusion About State Responsibility and International
Liability, 4 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 47, 51-53 (1991); von der Dunk, supra note 184, at 364.
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Adapting to the needs of space, the liability regime crafted by the
Outer Space Treaty and the Liability Convention is different in two
important ways. 212
First, under international space law, states are responsible for the
actions of their nationals.213 The standard state-centric international
law regime does not usually hold states responsible for their
nationals. 214  This unique requirement, however, is logical when
considering the nature of what space law is trying to regulate. Space
activities are inherently dangerous. 215 Because of this, and the state-
centric nature of international law, states regulate private national
actors. 216 Additionally, this liability scheme should be considered in the
light of the times when it was drafted. When scholars began addressing
space liability in the late 1950s, private space actors were not on the
drafters' minds. 217
Second, a state need not exhaust all domestic remedies before
asserting a claim under the Liability Convention.218 Traditional
international law, on the contrary, requires that a party exhaust all
domestic remedies before resorting to an international tribunal.219 In
space law, a claimant state can elect to pursue claims in the launching
state's municipal courts. 220 However, the claimant cannot seek "double
damages" by trying to recover damages for the same harm in different
tribunals. 221 This suggests that, although a claimant may try to recover
in multiple venues, it could not pursue parallel claims. 222
C. Which Regime Governs Space Claims?
States potentially have four avenues to pursue a claim for damages
in space: (1) the Liability Convention, (2) the Outer Space Treaty, (3)
212. LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 15, at 111.
213. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 23, art. VI; DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL,
supra note 1, at 36; Williams, supra note 79, at 1153.
214. BROWNLIE, supra note 111, at 165; LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 15, at 66.
215. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 37; JASENTULIYANA, supra note
9, at 35 n.40; LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 15, at 108; Ginsburg, supra note 43, at 516.
216. E.g., Commercial Space Launch Act, 51 U.S.C. § 50901(a)(7) (2010); see
JASENTULIYANA, supra note 9, at 404-05; LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 15, at 104-05; see
also Ginsburg, supra note 43, at 528-32 (discussing the development of U.S. space law and
the processes for holding private actors responsible).
217. See REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 5, at 49-50; DeBusschere, supra note 8, at
103.
218. Liability Convention, supra note 26, art. XI(1); HURWITZ, supra note 12, at 52.
219. LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 15, at 111.
220. Liability Convention, supra note 26, art. XI(2); see LYALL & LARSEN, supra note
15, at 111.
221. See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 15, at 111.
222. See id.
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standard recovery proceedings under international law, and (4)
municipal courts. 223 Which regime, therefore, governs?
There is no requirement that states resolve disputes through the
space treaties. 224 Some scholars argue that because the Outer Space
Treaty and the Liability Convention are lex specialis developed to deal
exclusively with space liability claims, those treaties should provide the
only remedy for claims for damage by space objects.225 The
International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility
suggest a specialized regime of international law controls as to the
exclusion of general international law. 226 This rationale makes sense,
given the space liability regime addresses unique situations in space.
This argument, however, disregards the cooperative nature of space
law. The space treaties do not preclude parties from using other
venueS227 and, in fact, encourage diplomatic solutions to disputes. 228
Only after diplomacy fails does the Claim Commission process begin. 229
Because only states may bring a claim under the space liability
regime, 230 having other avenues for relief recognizes the weaknesses in
the Westphalian system and promotes the victim-oriented nature of
space liability by allowing a non-state victim to recover even if the state
elects not to make a Liability Convention claim. 231 Therefore, it is best
to permit victims to use any of the four recovery avenues.
IV. SPACE LIABILITY IN PRACTICE
De-orbiting space debris is no longer a rare occurrence.
Fortunately, given the vastness of the oceans, most detritus falls
harmlessly into the seas. 232 In 1979, the United States had a close call
when Skylab fell remarkably close to Esperance, a small town eastern
Australia.233 Anticipating damages and in accordance with treaty
requirements, NASA prepared to respond to damage claims; however, it
223. See id. at 66-67.
224. HURwITZ, supra note 12, at 75; cf. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1,
at 147.
225. See CRAWFORD, supra note 187, at 306-08; Eigenbrodt, supra note 78, at 201.
226. See CRAWFORD, supra note 187, at 306.
227. See Liability Convention, supra note 26, arts. IX, XI; JASENTULIYANA, supra note
9, at 216-17; HURWITZ, supra note 12, at 75; LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 15, at 111.
228. See Liability Convention, supra note 26, art. XJV ("If no settlement of a claim is
arrived at through diplomatic negotiations as provided in Article IX . . ."); DIEDERIKS-
VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 40; JASENTULIYANA, supra note 9, at 220; LYALL &
LARSEN, supra note 15, at 112.
229. See Liability Convention, supra note 26, art. XIV.
230. See id. art. VIII (describing how a state may make a claim); Eigenbrodt, supra
note 78, at 196.
231. See HURWITZ, supra note 12, at 10, 207; Bosco, supra note 41, at 617.
232. See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 15, at 117.
233. Id.
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received none. 2 34 The closest "liability" was a light-hearted A$400 fine
for littering issued by a small Australian town.235 However, as the
skies become more crowded, debris will become more of a danger and
the Liability Convention will no doubt be put to the test. 236
A. Liability Convention Claim: Cosmos 954
The Liability Convention has been used, officially, only once. On
January 23, 1978, the Soviet Union's Cosmos 954 satellite fell from
orbit and crashed into a remote area of northwestern Canada. 237 The
satellite's nuclear power source used 65 kilograms of radioactive
material, which survived reentry and scattered over the crash area.
Canada conducted a massive clean-up operation that swept 124,000
square kilometers for radioactive material. 238 Although the Soviet
Union offered to assist the clean-up, Canada refused assistance and
later submitted a claim to recover clean-up and recovery costs using the
Liability Convention and general international law. 239 Couching the
demand in Article II terms, Canada invoked the Soviet Union's
responsibility as the launching state to compensate harm incurred. 240
The process began diplomatically, as the Liability Convention
intends. 241 The two states fought over the amount of compensation and
mitigating circumstances, but eventually reached an agreement in
1981.242 The Soviet Union paid Canada C$3,000,000 as a "full and final
settlement." 243 This agreement, however, did not acknowledge Soviet
liability. 244
Staunch advocates of a separate, clear space liability regime would
not be happy with this result. The Liability Convention provides the
234. Id.
235. The United States government, incidentally, never paid the fine. Ian O'Neill,
Celebrating July 13, "Skylab-Esperance Day", DISCOVERY NEWS, July 14, 2009,
http://news.discovery.com/space/celebrating-july-13-skylab-esperance-day.html.
236. See DIEDERIKs-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 141; Merges & Reynolds,
supra note 11, at 10010.
237. Eigenbrodt, supra note 78, at 200.
238. Ginsburg, supra note 43, at 546-47.
239. See Canada's Claim Against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for Damage
Caused by Soviet Cosmos 954, Annex A, TT 14-20, Jan. 23, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 899
[hereinafter Canada Claim]; Ginsburg, supra note 43, at 547.
240. See Canada Claim, supra note 239, Annex A, 14; Ginsburg, supra note 43, at
548.
241. See Canada Claim, supra note 239, Annex A, t$ 4-12; Ginsburg, supra note 43,
at 548.
242. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 42; Ginsburg, supra note
43, at 548.
243. Protocol on Settlement of Canada's Claim for Damages Caused by "Cosmos 954",
Can.-U.S.S.R., art. 2 Apr. 2, 1981, 20 I.L.M. 689 [hereinafter Cosmos Protocol]. See
Ginsburg, supra note 43, at 548-49.
244. See Cosmos Protocol, supra note 243, art. 1; Eigenbrodt, supra note 78, at 200.
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framework for initiating the claims process, but the parties did not
follow the Convention's one-year claims initiation process. 245 Because
the Claims Commission was not activated, there were no mechanisms
that facilitated recovery; Canada had to actively pursue relief, which
some argue is contrary to the purpose of having a liability separate
regime. 246 However, international space law does not provide a clear
process for prosecuting a space liability claims. The treaties merely
provide guidance on how claims should be made and what a state is
potentially responsible for. International cooperation, emphasized by
the Article IX requirement that claims be submitted through diplomatic
channels, was upheld.247 In the end, this dispute was solved; the Soviet
Union compensated Canada for the harm incurred. 248 Even though the
process was not exact, the Liability Convention served its purpose by
facilitating negotiations that led to a solution. 249
CONCLUSION: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATE SPACE ACTOR
Space science constantly advances; ideas unimagined in 1967 are
now feasible, which create unanticipated issues not addressed by the
treaties. This will challenge the Westphalian underpinnings of
international space law. For example, there are no treaty provisions
specifically addressing commercial ventures. 250 Space tourism is just
over the horizon 251 and, now that the Space Shuttle is retired, NASA
will rely on other states and the private sector for launch capabilities. 252
Questions of liability, insurance, and regulation are just a few issues
that need to be resolved. 253 Problems like debris removal in orbit
demonstrate the lack of enforceable legal obligations.254
The current space liability regime was based on a state-centric
model and designed for a world where outer space was dominated by
the United States and the Soviet Union.255 The treaties made states
245. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 42; Eigenbrodt, supra note
78, 201-02.
246. See FORKOSCH, supra note 74, at 12-13 (decrying the Liability Convention for
promoting a "self-help" regime).
247. See Liability Convention, supra note 26, art. IX; DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL,
supra note 1, at 42.
248. See Cosmos Protocol, supra note 243, art. I-II; DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL,
supra note 1, at 42.
249. See Eigenbrodt, supra note 78, at 202.
250. Hertzfeld, supra note 30, at 330.
251. Tiffany Gabbay, Richard Branson Wants to Take You into Outer Space, BUSINESS
INSIDER (July 5, 2011), http://articles.businessinsider.com/2011-07-05/lifestyle/3002336
3_1_space-travel-zero-gravity-spaceport.
252. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 121; Klotz, supra note 9.
253. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 121-22; Hertzfeld, supra
note 30, at 330.
254. See Goh, supra note 58, at 737; Merges & Reynolds, supra note 11, at 10010.
255. See Debusschere, supra note 8, at 103.
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responsible for damage because states had deep enough coffers to pay
the extraordinary costs for a space-related disaster. 256 Today, however,
outer space is increasingly crowded with other states and many private
actors. 257 States are still jointly and severally liable for satellite
networks owned and operated by multinational corporations. 25 8 The
state-centric regime is increasingly unworkable for private entities.
While more accessible for companies, general international law
principles do not provide the accessibility commercial ventures need.
Because of this, states are beginning to actively support commercial
space ventures. Many states require private companies to secure
insurance to protect both the company and the state from liability. 259
The United States' Commercial Space Launch Act, for example,
requires commercial ventures to obtain liability insurance. 260 If the
statutorily mandated insurance coverage is unavailable, the "maximum
liability insurance available on the world market at a reasonable cost"
is sufficient. 261 Liability insurance for space activities, however, is
always expensive and sometimes cannot be obtained. 262 And because of
the Westphalian structure, it is states that are ultimately liable for
damage under the space treaties. Consequently, national space policies
must balance protecting the state from liability with unnecessarily
chilling domestic commercial space ventures. 263
Government, however, may underestimate the ingenuity of
business. Perhaps "lawyers' fascination with liability issues" overly
emphasizes the importance of an international legal regime. 264
Commercial ventures, such as Richard Branson's Virgin Galactic and
Elon Musk's SpaceX, see a future in space. Already, companies are
finding ways to resolve disputes extra-judicially by contracting around
liability issues. 265 Companies insert cross-waivers of liability, whereby
each party agrees to bear its own risk. 266 When something goes awry,
256. See Christol, supra note 159, at 348.
257. See JASENTULIYANA, supra note 9, at 321; Merges & Reynolds, supra note 11, at
10010.
258. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KoPAL, supra note 1, at 107; Debusschere, supra
note 8, at 104-05.
259. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 113-14; JASENTULIYANA,
supra note 9, at 404-05. The following states require some form of insurance in their
municipal space codes: Australia, Russia, South Africa, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the
United States. See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 15, at 114-16.
260. 51 U.S.C. § 50914 (2012).
261. Id. § 50914(a)(3). The statutory minimums are $500,000,000 for third parties'
damage and loss claims and $100,000,000 for damage or loss to the Government.
262. See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 15, at 114.
263. See id. at 115.
264. REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 5, at 187.
265. LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 15, at 33.
266. DIEDERICKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 115.
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the contract pulls the dispute into municipal court.267 This, at least,
gives parties some certainty about the law governing the dispute.
Business will not let an imperfect treaty structure hinder space
development.
States cannot completely withdraw from liability disputes in space,
given the state-centric structure of international law and the huge sums
of money potentially involved in damage. However, states should
continue to foster commercial development by requiring companies to
have substantial liability insurance. In exchange for that protection,
the state would back the company in the international arena. This
protects the state from the brunt of liability while allowing companies
to resolve disputes through international channels.
267. See, e.g., Martin Marietta Corp. v. Int'l Telecomm. Satellite Org., 978 F.2d 140,
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